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Summary
The Bush Administration identified transformation as a major goal for the
Department of Defense (DOD) soon after taking office and emphasized the concept
during the period 2001-2004.  Defense transformation can be defined as large-scale,
discontinuous, and possibly disruptive changes in military weapons, concepts of
operations (i.e., approaches to warfighting), and organization.  The issue for the 2nd
session of the 109th Congress is how to take the concept of defense transformation
into account in assessing and acting on Administration proposals for DOD.
The Administration argues that new technologies make defense transformation
possible and that new threats to U.S. security make defense transformation necessary.
The Administration’s vision for defense transformation calls for placing increased
emphasis in U.S. defense planning on irregular warfare, including terrorism,
insurgencies, and civil war; potential catastrophic security threats, such as the
possession and possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and rogue
states; and potential disruptive events, such as the emergence of new technologies
that could undermine current U.S. military advantages.  The Administration’s vision
for defense transformation calls for shifting U.S. military forces toward a greater
reliance on joint operations, network-centric warfare, effects-based operations, speed
and agility, and precision application of firepower.  Transformation could affect the
defense industrial base by transferring funding from “legacy” systems to
transformational systems, and from traditional DOD contractors to firms that
previously have not done much defense work.
Debate has arisen over several elements of the Administration’s transformation
plan, including its emphasis on network-centric warfare; the planned total size of the
military; the balance between air and ground forces; the restructuring of the Army;
the balance of tactical aircraft relative to unmanned air vehicles and bombers; its
emphases on missile defense and special operations forces; and its plans regarding
reserve forces and forces for stability operations.  Potential areas of debate regarding
the Administration’s strategy for implementing transformation include overall
leadership and management; the balance of funding for transformation vs. near-term
priorities; the roles of DOD offices responsible for transformation; tests, exercises,
and metrics for transformation; independent analysis of the Administration’s plans;
and actions for creating a culture of innovation.
Some observers are concerned that the Administration’s regular (some might
even say habitual) use of the term transformation has turned the concept of
transformation into an empty slogan or buzz-phrase.  Other observers are concerned
that the Administration has invoked the term transformation as an all-purpose
rhetorical tool for justifying its various proposals for DOD, whether they relate to
transformation or not, and for encouraging minimal debate on those proposals by
tying the concept of transformation to the urgent need to fight the war on terrorism.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Defense Transformation:  Background and
Oversight Issues for Congress
Introduction
Issue For Congress
The Bush Administration identified transformation as a major goal for the
Department of Defense (DOD) soon after taking office.  The Administration argues
that new technologies make defense transformation possible, and that new threats to
U.S. security make defense transformation necessary.  The Administration has
justified many of its proposals for DOD on the grounds that they are needed for
defense transformation.  The Administration’s emphasis on transformation has
altered the framework of debate for numerous issues relating to U.S. defense policy
and programs.
The issue for the 2nd session of the 109th Congress is how to take the concept of
defense transformation into account in assessing and acting on Administration
proposals for DOD.  Key oversight questions for Congress relating to this issue
include the following:
! Is defense transformation necessary or desirable?
! If so, is the Administration’s plan for defense transformation
appropriate in terms of content and implementation strategy?
! What implications might the Administration’s plan for defense
transformation have for congressional oversight of DOD activities?
Congress’s decisions on these issues could have significant implications for
future U.S. military capabilities, DOD funding requirements, the defense industrial
base, and future congressional oversight of DOD activities.
Related CRS Reports
This report addresses defense transformation from a DOD-wide perspective.
For discussions of transformation as it relates to specific parts of DOD, see the
following CRS reports:
! CRS Report RS20787, Army Transformation and Modernization:
Overview and Issues for Congress, by Edward F. Bruner,
CRS-2
! CRS Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for
Congress, by Andrew Feickert,
! CRS Report RS20859, Air Force Transformation, by Christopher
Bolkcom,
! CRS Report RS20851, Naval Transformation: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke,
! CRS Report RL32411, Network Centric Warfare: Background and
Oversight Issues for Congress, by Clay Wilson,
! CRS Report RL31425, Military Transformation: Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, by Judy G. Chizek,
! CRS Report RL32151, DOD Transformation Initiatives and the
Military Personnel System: Proceedings of a CRS Seminar, by
Lawrence Kapp, and
! CRS Report RL33148, U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New
Developments and Oversight Issues for Congress, by Robert D.
Critchlow.
Organization of the Report
The next section of this report provides basic background information on
defense transformation.  The following section addresses key oversight questions for
Congress.
Background
This section provides basic background information on the concept of defense
transformation and the Administration’s plans for defense transformation.  Questions
addressed in this section include the following:
! What is defense transformation?
! What are the Administration’s plans for defense transformation?
! How much would defense transformation cost?
! What military weapons and systems are considered
transformational?
! How might the Administration’s transformation plans, if
implemented, affect the U.S. defense industrial base?
! What implications might defense transformation have for the ability
of U.S. military forces to participate in combined operations with the
military forces of allied and friendly countries?
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1 Some transformation advocates argue that transformation can and should be pursued
during periods of military dominance and political stability.  They argue that countries that
are defeated in military conflicts learn much faster from their experience in war than do
countries that are victorious.  Victorious countries, they argue, can become complacent,
making only incremental improvements to military forces and concepts of operations that
appear dominant, and are then unpleasantly surprised in subsequent conflicts by adversaries
that, in the meantime, have developed new and unforeseen military capabilities.
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director, Force
Transformation, Military Transformation[:] A Strategic Approach, fall 2003, p. 8.
What Is Defense Transformation?
The term defense transformation came into common use in the late 1990s.  It
has been defined by military officials, military analysts, and other observers in
various ways.  In general, though, defense transformation can be thought of as large-
scale, discontinuous, and possibly disruptive changes in military weapons, concepts
of operations (i.e., approaches to warfighting), and organization that are prompted by
significant changes in technology or the emergence of new and different international
security challenges.1
Advocates of defense transformation stress that, in contrast to incremental or
evolutionary military change brought about by normal modernization efforts, defense
transformation is more likely to feature discontinuous or disruptive forms of change.
They also stress that while much of the discussion over transformation centers on
changes in military weapons and systems, changes in organization and concepts of
operations can be as important, or even more important, than changes in weapons and
systems in bringing about transformation.  Changes in organization and concepts of
operation, some have argued, can lead to transformation even without changes in
weapons and systems, while even dramatic changes in weapons and systems might
not lead to transformation if not accompanied by changes in organization and
concepts of operation.
DOD has defined transformation in one document as a
process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation
through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations
that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric
vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and
stability in the world.
First and foremost, transformation is a continuing process. It does not have
an end point.  Transformation anticipates and creates the future and deals with
the co-evolution of concepts, processes, organizations, and technology.  Profound
change in any one of these areas necessitates change in all.  Transformation
creates new competitive areas and competencies and identifies, leverages, or
creates new underlying principles for the way things are done.  Transformation
also identifies and leverages new sources of power.  The overall objective of
these changes is to sustain U.S. competitive advantage in warfare.2
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3 For additional discussion, see U.S. Department of Defense, Elements of Defense
Transformation.  Washington, 2004, 17 pp.  Available on the Internet at
[http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_383_ElementsOfTransformation_
LR.pdf]
4 NCW refers to using networking technology — computers, data links, and networking
software — to link U.S. military personnel, ground vehicles, aircraft, and ships into a series
of highly integrated local- and wide-area networks capable of sharing critical tactical
information on a rapid and continuous basis.  For more on NCW, see U.S. Department of
Defense, Office of Force Transformation, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare.
Washington, 2005, 76 pp.  Available on the Internet at
[http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_387_NCW_Book_LowRes.pdf]
5 C4ISR stands for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance.
6 In general, this means making U.S. forces more capable of rapidly moving to distant
operating areas and conducting operations in those areas with less reliance on pre-existing
in-theater bases, infrastructure, or supplies.
The Administration’s view of transformation has evolved somewhat since early
2001 to include more emphasis on transformation as a continuing process rather than
one with an endpoint, and on making changes not just in combat forces and
warfighting doctrine, but in supporting DOD activities such as training, personnel
management, logistics, and worldwide basing arrangements.  The Administration’s
definition of transformation also encompasses making changes in DOD business
policies, practices, and procedures, particularly with an eye toward streamlining
operations and achieving efficiencies so as to reduce costs and move new weapon
technologies from the laboratory to the field more quickly.  The Administration has
also used the term transformation to refer to proposed changes in matters such as the
budget process and environmental matters affecting military training.3
Some observers have equated transformation principally with the idea of making
U.S. forces more mobile, agile, and lethal through greater reliance on things such as
unmanned vehicles (UVs), advanced technologies for precision-strike operations, and
special operations forces (SOF).  Other observers have equated transformation
principally with the concept of network-centric warfare (NCW)4 and the C4ISR5
technologies needed to implement NCW.  Still others have equated transformation
primarily with making U.S. military forces more expeditionary,6 with making order-
of-magnitude improvements in specific military capabilities, with making many
smaller improvements that add up to larger improvements, or with the notion of
weapon modernization in general.
Some of these alternative formulations are not so much definitions of
transformation as prescriptions for how U.S. military forces should be transformed.
Others can be viewed as reducing the threshold of what qualifies as transformation
by including changes that, while perhaps dramatic, represent an elaboration of current
practices and arrangements rather than something discontinuous with or disruptive
of those practices and arrangements.
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7 The term RMA was a reformulation of the even earlier term, Military Technical
Revolution (MTR), which was coined by Soviet military analysts during the Cold War to
refer to fundamental changes in warfare that are brought about by major new technologies,
such as nuclear weapons.  Western military analysts, concerned that the term MTR placed
too exclusive an emphasis on changes in technology, created the term RMA so as to take
into account changes in military organization and concepts of operations as well.
8 For press articles discussing this shift in the focus of U.S. defense planning, see Jason
Sherman, “US Revises Threat Scenarios,” DefenseNews.com, November 22, 2004; Jason
Sherman, “US War On Terror Looms For QDR,” Defense News, October 25, 2004: 4; Jason
Sherman, “U.S. Goals Sought On Battling The Unconventional,” Defense News, September
20, 2004; and Thomas E. Ricks, “Shift From Traditional War Seen At Pentagon,”
Washington Post, September 3, 2004: 1.
9 Attrition-style warfare refers to a traditional warfighting strategy that focuses on seeking
out the enemy’s military forces, wherever they might be, and then using firepower to destroy
them piece by piece, through a process of gradual attrition, until the enemy is no longer
(continued...)
Related to the concept of defense transformation is the somewhat earlier term
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which came into use in the early 1990s.7
RMAs are periodic major changes — discontinuities — in the character of warfare.
Depending on the source consulted, a few or several RMAs are deemed to have
occurred in recent decades or centuries.  Although the terms transformation and
RMA have sometimes been used interchangeably, RMA can be used to refer to a
major change in the character of warfare, while transformation can be used to refer
to the process of changing military weapons, concepts of operation, and organization
in reaction to (or anticipation of) an RMA.
What Are The Administration’s Plans For Transformation?
DOD Publications.  DOD has published a number of documents describing
the Administration’s plans for defense transformation.  Among these are Elements
of Defense Transformation, published in October 2004, Military Transformation: A
Strategic Approach, published in the fall of 2003, Transformation Planning
Guidance, published in April 2003, and separate transformation plans (called road
maps) for each of the military services.  These and other DOD publications on
transformation can be found at the website for DOD’s Office of Force
Transformation [http://www.oft.osd.mil].
Overall Vision.  In general, the Administration’s vision for defense
transformation calls for placing increased emphasis in U.S. defense planning on
irregular warfare (including terrorism, insurgencies, and civil war), potential
catastrophic security threats (such as the possession and possible use of weapons of
mass destruction by terrorists and rogue states), and potential disruptive events (such
as the emergence of new technologies that could undermine current U.S. military
advantages).8
The Administration’s vision for defense transformation calls for shifting the
U.S. military away from a reliance on massed forces, sheer quantity of firepower,
military services operating in isolation from one another, and attrition-style warfare,9
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9 (...continued)
capable of fighting effectively.
10 Effects-based operations , also called effects-based warfare, refers to a warfighting
strategy that has been proposed as an alternative to traditional attrition-style warfare.  Rather
than focusing on seeking out and destroying enemy forces wherever they might be, effects-
based operations focuses on attacking selected key elements of the enemy’s ability to fight
in a coordinated manner.  Under an effects-based strategy, U.S. forces might attack the
enemy’s military leadership, its military command-and-control systems, and the most
politically and militarily significant elements of the enemy’s fielded military forces while
bypassing less significant enemy military forces.  The goal of  effects-based warfare is to
create specific effects on the enemy that lead to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s willingness
and ability to fight, without having to go through a time-consuming and potentially costly
effort to destroy the bulk of the enemy’s military forces through a gradual process of
attrition.
Some observers argue that the concept of effects-based operations is not new and has been
employed in past conflicts.  Observers also argue, however, that new technologies may
significantly increase the effectiveness of effects-based operations.
and toward a greater reliance on joint (i.e., integrated multi-service) operations,
NCW, effects-based operations (EBO),10 speed and agility, and precision application
of firepower.  Some transformation advocates characterize these changes as shifting
from an industrial-age approach to war to an information-age approach.  As
mentioned earlier, the Administration’s transformation vision also includes proposals
for changing things like training practices, personnel management practices, logistics
operations, and worldwide basing arrangements, and for changing DOD’s business
practices, particularly with an eye toward streamlining those practices so as to
accelerate the fielding of new weapons and generate savings that can be used to
invest in them.
DOD has stated that its transformation effort is focused on achieving six
“critical operational goals” and consists of four essential “pillars:”
Six critical operational goals identified by Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld provide the focus for the Department’s transformation efforts: (1)
Protecting critical bases and defeating chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons; (2) Projecting and sustaining forces in anti-access
environments; (3) Denying enemy sanctuary; (4) Leveraging information
technology; (5) Assuring information systems and conducting information
operations; and (6) Enhancing space capabilities.  Over time, the continued focus
of the Department’s force transformation efforts on the development of the
capabilities necessary to achieve these six critical operational goals will help
shift the balance of U.S. forces and broaden our capabilities....
The four military transformation pillars identified by the Secretary —
strengthening joint operations, exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages, concept
development and experimentation, and developing transformational capabilities
 — constitute the essential elements of the Department’s force transformation
strategy. The first pillar focuses on strengthening joint operations through the
development of joint concepts and architectures and the pursuit of other
important jointness initiatives and interoperability goals. The overarching Joint
Operations Concepts (JOpsC) document provides the operational context for
CRS-7
11 Military Transformation[:] A Strategic Approach, op. cit., p. 3.
military transformation by linking strategic guidance with the integrated
application of Joint Force capabilities. The second pillar involves exploiting U.S.
intelligence advantages through multiple intelligence collection assets, global
surveillance and reconnaissance, and enhanced exploitation and dissemination.
Our ability to defend America in the new security environment requires
unprecedented intelligence capabilities to anticipate where, when, and how
adversaries intend to harm us.
The third pillar, concept development and experimentation, involves
experimentation with new approaches to warfare, operational concepts and
capabilities, and organizational constructs through war gaming, simulations, and
field exercises focused on emerging challenges and opportunities.  Experiments
designed to evaluate new concepts provide results that help refine those concepts
in an iterative fashion. [Regarding the fourth pillar, the] Department requires
strong mechanisms for implementing results from concept development and
experimentation and, more immediately, for developing transformational
capabilities needed to support the JOpsC and subordinate Joint Operating
Concepts.11
In its report on the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, submitted to Congress
on February 6, 2006, DOD stated:
If one were to attempt to characterize the nature of how the Department of
Defense is transforming and how the senior leaders of this Department view that
transformation, it is useful to view it as a shift of emphasis to meet the new
strategic environment. In this era, characterized by uncertainty and surprise,
examples of this shift in emphasis include:
! From a peacetime tempo — to a wartime sense of urgency.
! From a time of reasonable predictability — to an era of surprise and
uncertainty.
! From single-focused threats — to multiple, complex challenges.
! From nation-state threats — to decentralized network threats from
non-state enemies.
! From conducting war against nations — to conducting war in countries we
are not at war with (safe havens).
! From “one size fi ts all” deterrence — to tailored deterrence for rogue
powers, terrorist networks and near-term competitors.
! From responding after a crisis starts (reactive) — to preventive actions so
problems do not become crises (proactive).
! From crisis response — to shaping the future.
! From threat-based planning — to capabilities-based planning.
! From peacetime planning — to rapid adaptive planning.
! From a focus on kinetics — to a focus on effects.
! From 20th century processes — to 21st century integrated approaches.
! From static defense, garrison forces — to mobile, expeditionary
operations.
! From under-resourced, standby forces (hollow units) — to fully-equipped
and fully-manned forces (combat ready units).
! From a battle-ready force (peace) — to battle-hardened forces (war).
CRS-8
12 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report.  Washington, 2006.
(February 6, 2006)  pp. vi-vii.
! From large institutional forces (tail) — to more powerful operational
capabilities (teeth).
! From major conventional combat operations — to multiple irregular,
asymmetric operations.
! From separate military Service concepts of operation — to joint and
combined operations.
! From forces that need to deconflict — to integrated, interdependent
forces.
! From exposed forces forward — to reaching back to CONUS [the
continental United States] to support expeditionary forces.
! From an emphasis on ships, guns, tanks and planes — to focus on
information, knowledge and timely, actionable intelligence.
! From massing forces — to massing effects.
! From set-piece maneuver and mass — to agility and precision.
! From single Service acquisition systems — to joint portfolio management.
! From broad-based industrial mobilization — to targeted commercial
solutions.
! From Service and agency intelligence — to truly Joint Information
Operations Centers.
! From vertical structures and processes (stovepipes) — to more
transparent, horizontal integration (matrix).
! From moving the user to the data — to moving data to the user.
! From fragmented homeland assistance — to integrated homeland security.
! From static alliances — to dynamic partnerships.
! From predetermined force packages — to tailored, flexible forces.
! From the U.S. military performing tasks — to a focus on building partner
capabilities.
! From static post-operations analysis — to dynamic diagnostics and
real-time lessons learned.
! From focusing on inputs (eff ort) — to tracking outputs (results).
! From Department of Defense solutions — to interagency approaches.12
Service and Agency Transformation Plans.  The military services and
DOD agencies have developed transformation plans or road maps in support of
DOD’s overall transformation vision.
The Army’s transformation plan centers on reorganizing the Army into modular,
brigade-sized forces called Units of Action (UAs) that can be deployed to distant
operating areas more easily and can be more easily tailored to meet the needs of each
contingency.
Key elements of the Air Force’s transformation plan include reorganizing the
service to make it more expeditionary, and exploiting new technologies and
operational concepts to dramatically improve its ability to rapidly deploy and sustain
forces, to dominate air and space, and to rapidly identify and precisely attack targets
on a global basis.
Key elements of naval transformation include a focus on operating in littoral
(i.e., near shore) waters, new-design ships requiring much-smaller crews, directly
CRS-9
13 Vice Admiral Cebrowski died on November 12, 2005, after a long illness.
14 Jason Sherman, “Retired Admiral Tapped To Recommend Options for DOD
Transformation Office,” InsideDefense.com, April 1, 2005.
15 Jason Sherman, “DSB: Commanders Require New Tools For Transformation In Terror
War,” Inside the Pentagon, September 1, 2005.
16 Ibid.  See also Roxana Tiron, “Military-Transformation Agency At Crossroads, After
Cebrowski,” The Hill, September 15, 2005.
launching and supporting expeditionary operations ashore from sea bases, more
flexible naval formations, and more flexible ship-deployment methods.
Elements common to the transformation plans of all the services include greater
jointness, implementing NCW, and greater use of unmanned vehicles (UVs).  As
mentioned earlier, for more on the transformation plans of the Army in general, the
Army plan for UAs, the Air Force, and the Navy, see CRS Report RS20787, CRS
Report RL32476, CRS Report RS20859, and CRS Report RS20851, respectively.
Office of Force Transformation.  To help implement transformation, DOD
created the Office of Force Transformation (OFT), which resides within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  OFT is a small office with a staff of fewer than
30 people and an annual budget of roughly $30 million.  It reports directly to the
Secretary of Defense.  Among other things, OFT issues guidance to the rest of DOD
on transformation; reviews and approves transformation plans submitted by the
military services and DOD agencies; acts as a generator, promoter, and clearinghouse
of ideas for transformation; and generally evangelizes in support of transformation.
From October 29, 2001, until January 31, 2005, OFT was headed by retired
Navy Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski.13  Cebrowski was previously the President
of the Naval War College, where he was a leading proponent of the then-emerging
concept of NCW and initiated studies on radically new kinds of Navy warships. As
of January 27, 2006, a permanent replacement for Cebrowski had not been named.
In April 2005, it was reported that in the wake of Cebrowski’s departure from
OFT, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had commissioned retired admiral James
Ellis, who commanded the U.S. Strategic Command from 2001 to 2004, to prepare
a set of options for OFT’s future.  These options reportedly include, but may not be
limited to, keeping OFT as is, moving it to a new location within DOD (such as
under DOD’s acquisition office or under U.S. Joint Forces Command), or expanding
OFT.14  Ellis’ study reportedly also recommended that a new director be found for
OFT.15
In September 2005, it was reported that a study conducted by the Defense
Science Board (DSB) — an advisory panel to the Secretary of Defense — suggested
that, in light of the broad acceptance of transformation within DOD over the last few
years, OFT may no longer be necessary.  The DSB study reportedly refers to OFT as
“an organizational applique” and criticizes OFT’s role in overseeing and critiquing
the services transformation plans.16
CRS-10
17 [http://www.jfcom.mil/about/about1.htm].
18 CRS Report RS21195, Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development in DOD
Programs: Policy Issues for Congress, by Gary J. Pagliano and Ronald O’Rourke.
U.S. Joint Forces Command.  As another measure to help implement
transformation, DOD designated U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), a unified
military command with a staff of more than 800 headquartered in Norfolk, VA, as
the military’s premier “transformation laboratory.”  USJFCOM states:
U. S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is one of nine combatant
commands in the Department of Defense, and the only combatant command
focused on the transformation of U.S. military capabilities.
Among his duties, the commander of USJFCOM oversees the command’s
four primary roles in transformation — joint concept development and
experimentation, joint training, joint interoperability and integration, and the
primary conventional force provider as outlined in the Unified Command Plan
approved by the president.
The Unified Command Plan designates USJFCOM as the “transformation
laboratory” of the United States military to enhance the combatant commanders’
capabilities to implement the president’s strategy. USJFCOM develops joint
operational concepts, tests these concepts through rigorous experimentation,
educates joint leaders, trains joint task force commanders and staffs, and
recommends joint solutions to the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines to better
integrate their warfighting capabilities....
As the joint force integrator, USJFCOM helps develop, evaluate, and
prioritize the solutions to the interoperability problems plaguing the joint
warfighter.  At USJFCOM, joint interoperability and integration initiatives
continue to deliver materiel and non-materiel solutions to interoperability
challenges by working closely with combatant commanders, services and
government agencies to identify and resolve joint warfighting deficiencies.
This work is one of the most important near-term factors required to
transform the legacy forces and establish a “coherently integrated joint force.”17
New Weapon Acquisition Regulations.  As a fourth step to help
implement transformation, the Administration has revised the regulations governing
the acquisition of new weapons and systems with the aim of reducing costs and
“acquisition cycle time” — the time needed to turn useful new technologies into
fielded weapon systems.  A key element of DOD’s effort in this regard is
evolutionary acquisition with spiral development (EA/SD), which DOD has
identified is its new preferred acquisition strategy.  EA/SD is an outgrowth of the
defense acquisition reform movement of the 1990s and is intended to make its
acquisition system more responsive to rapid changes in threats, technology, and
warfighter needs.  For more on EA/SD, see CRS Report RS21195.18
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How Much Would Transformation Cost?
Calculating the potential cost of defense transformation is not an easy matter,
for the following reasons:
! Opinions differ, often significantly, on what kinds of planned
changes for DOD qualify as transformational, and which do not.
! Developing and acquiring new weapons and equipment that are
deemed transformational can be very expensive, but the cost of this
can be offset, perhaps substantially or even completely, by reducing
or cancelling the development and procurement of non-
transformational weapons and equipment that would no longer be
needed.
! Implementing transformational changes in organization can also cost
money, but these costs might similarly be offset by the reduced
recurring cost of maintaining the new forms of organization.
! While exercises intended to explore new warfighting concepts of
operation can be expensive, the cost of staging these exercises can
be offset by curtailing other exercises that are intended to further
develop older concepts of operations.
! If transformation is viewed as a continuing process rather than one
with an endpoint, any calculations of its cost become snapshots
rather than final figures.
Although some analysts who advocate defense transformation might personally
support increased spending on defense, most appear to advocate transformation as
a cost-neutral or cost-reducing proposition.  Indeed, some advocates support their
proposals for transformation on the grounds that they represent a less-expensive
strategy for meeting future security challenges than the alternative of investing in
programs for making more incremental or evolutionary changes to current military
capabilities.  Some analysts have gone even further, arguing that an increasing
defense budget might actually impede transformation by permitting officials to
believe that projected security challenges can be solved by investing larger amounts
of funding in today’s military forces, while a constrained or declining defense budget,
conversely, might help encourage transformation by forcing officials to contemplate
more seriously the idea of shifting to new and less expensive approaches for meeting
these challenges.
The Administration has stressed that its interest in incorporating current best
private-sector business practices in DOD operations, and in running DOD more “like
a business,” is driven in large part by a desire to run DOD more efficiently and
thereby generate maximum savings that can be used for, among other things,
investing in transformation.
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What Weapons And Systems Are Transformational?
Although transformation involves (and might even depend more significantly
on) changes in organization and concepts of operations, much of the debate over
transformation has centered on which military weapons and systems should be
deemed transformational, and which not.  Experts disagree on this question, even when
working from a common definition of transformation.  As a result, lists of weapons and
systems that qualify as transformational differ from one source to the next.
Supporters of various weapon procurement programs, keenly aware of the
Administration’s interest in transformation, have been eager to argue that their own
favored weapon systems should be viewed transformational, or at least not as
“legacy” — a label that for many has become synonymous with obsolescence and
suitability for reduction or termination.19  As a result, a wide variety of military weapons
and systems have been presented at one point or another as transformational, while fewer
have been spotlighted as non-transformational or legacy.
Weapons and systems that have frequently been identified as closely associated
with the Administration’s transformation vision include but are not necessarily
limited to the following:
! C4ISR systems that link military units into highly integrated
networks for conducting NCW,




! special operations forces,
! precision-guided air-delivered weapons,
! lighter and more mobile Army ground forces, and
! smaller and faster Navy surface ships.
Weapons and systems that have been identified by various observers, not
necessarily by DOD, as non-transformational or legacy include the following:
! weapons and associated C4ISR systems that operate in an isolated,
stand-alone manner rather than as part of a network,
! unguided weapons,
! heavy armored forces for the Army,
! manned tactical aircraft, and
! large, slower-moving Navy surface ships.
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How Might It Affect the Defense Industrial Base?
A related matter of interest to Congress is how the Administration’s
transformation plans, if implemented, might affect the composition of U.S. defense
spending and, as a consequence, revenues and employment levels of various firms
in the defense industrial base.  In assessing this issue, potential points to consider
include the following:
! Transformational vs. non-transformational/legacy programs.
To some degree, implementing the Administration’s transformation
vision could lead to increased DOD spending on the items listed
above as transformational, and more restrained amounts of spending
on the items listed above as non-transformational or legacy.
! Large-scale systems integration work.  Implementing the
Administration’s transformation plan could lead to increased DOD
spending for the large-scale systems integration work that is required
to tie individual military weapons and systems together into
smoothly functioning “systems of systems.”  Some defense firms,
particularly some of the larger ones, have taken steps to strengthen
and publicize their capacity for performing this kind of work.
! Large, diversified contractors vs. specific units within them and
smaller firms.  For larger defense firms that perform a wide range
of work for DOD,20 implementing the Administration’s
transformation plan might transfer revenues from one part of the
company to another without necessarily having a major effect on the
company’s bottom line.  The potential effect on individual units
within those firms, however, may be greater, if those facilities
specialize in producing only certain kinds of defense goods or
services.  These units — as well as smaller defense firms that
perform a less-diverse array of work for DOD — may be more likely
to experience either an increase or decrease in revenues and
employment levels as a result of transformation.21
! Traditional vs. non-traditional DOD contractors.  Some new
technologies that may contribute to transformation, particularly
certain information technologies, are found more in the civilian
economy than in the world of defense-related research.  As a result,
implementing the Administration’s transformation plan could shift
some DOD spending away from traditional DOD contractors and
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toward firms that previously have done little or no business with
DOD.  Indeed, DOD is attempting to encourage firms that have not
previously done business with DOD — so-called “non-traditional”
contractors — to begin doing business with DOD, so that DOD may
make maximum use of applicable technologies from the civilian
sector.
How Might It Affect Operations With Allied Forces?
What implications might defense transformation have for the ability of U.S.
military forces to participate in combined operations with the military forces of allied
and friendly countries?  DOD states that it is working toward a transformed force
capable of conducting effective combined operations:
As the U.S. military transforms, our interests are served by making arrangements
for international military cooperation to ensure that rapidly transforming U.S.
capabilities can be applied effectively with allied and coalition capabilities. U.S.
transformation objectives should be used to shape and complement foreign
military developments and priorities of likely partners, both in bilateral and
multilateral contexts.22
In spite of this stated intention, however, other observers, including some in
allied and friendly countries, have expressed concern that U.S. defense
transformation could widen the current gap between U.S. and foreign military
concepts and capabilities, which is already quite significant in some respects, and
thereby make U.S. forces less compatible with allied and friendly forces.  Reduced
compatibility, they believe, could lead to reduced coalition warfighting effectiveness
when the United States engages in combined operations with allied and friendly
forces,  increased risk of fratricide (i.e., friendly-fire) incidents involving U.S. and
coalition forces, and increased risk of political friction between the United States and
its coalition partners.
Whether transformation strengthens or weakens the ability of U.S. forces to
participate in combined operations with foreign military forces will depend in part
on decisions made by foreign governments.  If these governments, for example,
invest in networking technologies for NCW that are compatible with those used by
U.S. forces, it could increase interoperability with U.S. military forces to a level that
was not possible in pre-NCW times.  Conversely, if those governments do not
significantly invest in networking-related technologies for NCW, or invest in
technologies that are not compatible with those of U.S. forces, it could reduce
interoperability between U.S. forces and the forces of those countries below what it
is today.  Under this latter scenario, operations involving U.S. and foreign military
forces might be combined operations in name only, with the foreign forces assigned
to marginal or other functions that can be performed acceptably without being fully
incorporated into the U.S. network or without creating complications.
CRS-15
23 For background information on the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see CRS Report RL30609,
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Proposals for Reforming the Joint
Officer Personnel Management Program, by Katherine Lemay Brown.
Future interoperability with foreign military forces will also depend in part on
decisions made together by U.S. and foreign leaders.  Decisions that align emerging
U.S. concepts of operations with those of foreign military forces, and to hold
combined exercises employing these new concepts of operations, could improve the
potential for conducting effective combined operations.  Conversely, lack of
coordination in emerging concepts of operations, or of exercises to practice them
together, could impede interoperability and reduce the potential for effective
combined operations.
What Transformational Changes Has Congress Initiated?
Congress in past years has instituted changes that can be viewed as examples of,
or contributors to, defense transformation, including changes that were opposed (or
at least not proposed or actively supported) by DOD leaders.  Examples of such
actions include the following:
! Congress played a leading role in promoting jointness within DOD
by creating the landmark 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (P.L. 99-
433), which, among other things, strengthened the institutional roles
played by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders in charge of
joint forces assigned to various regions around the world.  Although
the term defense transformation was not in common use in 1986, the
Goldwater-Nichols Act today can be viewed, in retrospect, as a
significant early example of defense transformation.23
! Congress in 1986 also expressed concern for the status of SOF
within overall U.S. defense planning and passed legislation —
Section 1311 of the FY1987 defense authorization act (P.L. 99-661)
 — to strengthen its position.  Among other things, Section 1311
established the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as
a new unified command.  To the extent that enhancement of special
operations forces is now considered a key element of defense
transformation, this action also can be viewed, in retrospect, as an
early example of transformation.
! In 2000, Congress passed legislation — Section 220 of the FY2001
defense authorization act (P.L. 106-398) — that established a
transformation-related goal for unmanned vehicles.  The provision
stated that “It shall be a goal of the Armed Forces to achieve the
fielding of unmanned, remotely controlled technology such that —
(1) by 2010, one-third of the aircraft in the operational deep strike
force aircraft fleet are unmanned; and (2) by 2015, one-third of the
operational ground combat vehicles are unmanned.”
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Oversight Issues for Congress
This section addresses the following potential oversight issues for Congress:
! Is defense transformation necessary or desirable?
! If so, is the Administration’s plan for defense transformation
appropriate in terms of content and implementation strategy?
! What implications might the Administration’s plan for defense
transformation have for congressional oversight of DOD activities?
Is Defense Transformation Necessary or Desirable?
One potential oversight issue for Congress is whether transformation is
necessary or desirable.  Supporters of the notion that transformation is necessary or
desirable make five general arguments:
! New technologies make possible the creation of new,
transformational military capabilities.
! Transformation is required to meet emerging asymmetric security
challenges.
! Transformation is also required to preserve U.S. superiority in
conventional warfare over the long run.
! The current lack of a global or regional military peer competitor
creates an opportunity — a window in time — to invest in
transformation at acceptable risk.
! Transformation will be less expensive in the long run than
attempting to meet emerging asymmetric threats or preserve U.S.
conventional superiority through more routine modernization of
current capabilities.24
New Technologies.  Supporters of transformation argue that advanced
information technologies, as well as new technologies for distributed sensors,
unmanned vehicles, and precision-guided munitions, make possible the creation of
new, transformational military capabilities in the form of agile, distributed forces
armed with precision-guided weapons that can operate in a network-centric
environment so as to conduct effects-based operations. Incorporating these new
technologies into today’s forces without undergoing transformational changes in
organization and concepts of operation, they argue, would waste much of the
potential warfighting benefit afforded by these technologies.
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Skeptics could argue that although new technologies make transformation
possible, that doesn’t necessarily mean that transformation is necessary or desirable
right now.  These technologies, they could argue, can be incorporated into U.S. forces
through routine modernization of existing capabilities, without making
transformational changes in organization and concept of operation.  The notion that
transformational change is needed to adequately capture the benefits of these new
technologies, they could argue, is theoretical and unproven.  Changes in organization
and concepts of operation, they could argue, can always be made later, if practical
experience shows that incorporating these technologies through routine
modernization does not adequately exploit their warfighting potential.
Asymmetric Challenges.  Supporters of transformation argue that
transformation is needed to counter emerging asymmetric military challenges, in
which adversaries avoid competing head-on against conventional U.S. military
strengths.  Emerging asymmetric challenges that transformation supporters cite
include (but are not necessarily limited to) terrorism; nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons; long-range ballistic and cruise missiles; cyberwarfare; attacks
on U.S. military satellites; and anti-access/area-denial (AA/AD) systems aimed at
preventing U.S. forces from gaining access to ports, airfields, bases, staging areas,
and littoral (near-shore) waters that U.S. forces  now depend on to mount military
operations in distant theaters.25  Routine modernization of current U.S. military
forces, they argue, will not provide forces well suited to countering these emerging
asymmetric challenges.
Skeptics could argue that asymmetric military challenges may require certain
enhancements to current U.S. military capabilities, but that these enhancements can
be made by adding or expanding selected military capabilities, or through routine
modernization of current capabilities.  For example, they could argue, intelligence
capabilities and special operations forces can be strengthened to counter terrorism,
and ballistic missile defenses can be fielded, without requiring significant changes
to other parts of the military.  Asymmetric challenges, they could argue, are nothing
new — the United States has long had to contend with thinking adversaries that could
adapt and change — and DOD has successfully dealt with such challenges in the past
without undertaking transformational changes.
Preserving Conventional Superiority.  Supporters of transformation argue
that transformation is also needed ensure that the current U.S. superiority in
conventional warfare does not erode over time.  Many of the key technologies that
are involved in U.S. defense transformation, including information technologies, they
argue, are widely available and will be similarly exploited by the military forces of
potential U.S. adversaries.  Consequently, they argue, routine modernization of
current U.S. military forces that does not take full advantage of these new
technologies will not be sufficient to preserve current U.S. superiority in
conventional warfare.
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Skeptics could argue that transformation is not necessarily required to preserve
U.S. conventional superiority over the long run.  They could argue that, as
demonstrated by recent major combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
the current degree of U.S. superiority in conventional warfare is so large, and the
potential cost for other countries to challenge that superiority (even with use of new
technologies and concepts of operations) is so high, that challenges to U.S.
conventional superiority are unlikely, and that any challenges that do occur would
require many years to implement.  Consequently, they could argue, routine
modernization efforts will be sufficient to preserve U.S. conventional superiority for
many years.
Opportunity And Risk.  Transformation supporters argue that the current
lack of a worldwide or major regional military peer competitor to the United States
creates an opportunity — a window in time — that permits the United States, at
acceptable risk, to shift some funds away from nearer-term routine modernization
programs and toward longer-term efforts aimed at creating new, transformational
military capabilities.  Putting off transformation until the emergence of a military
peer competitor, they argue, would not only make it more difficult for the United
States to respond to that competitor, but could also make the emergence of such
competitors more likely by encouraging potential competitors to believe that the
United States was neglecting to maintain its superiority in conventional warfare.
Other transformation supporters argue that current U.S. operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, the Balkans, and other locations is accelerating transformation by
prompting rapid, battle-induced changes in U.S. technology, organization, and
concepts of operations.  They also argue that U.S. operations in these locations
promote transformation because the return of individual U.S. units from these
locations at the ends of their periods of deployment provides a natural opportunity
to “reset” those units to a new, transformed organization.26
Skeptics could argue that current operational demands on U.S. forces in Iraq,
Afghanistan, the Balkans, and other locations, far from creating a window of
opportunity for transformation, increase the risks of attempting transformation right
now.  Shifting funds away from near-term readiness and modernization and toward
longer-term efforts aimed at transformation, and making changes in organization and
concepts of operations, they could argue, could reduce readiness and disrupt
institutional relationships in the military at a time when U.S. forces are maintaining
a high tempo of operations and face lethal threats from insurgent forces.  Attempting
transformation now, they could argue, would be like trying to change horses in the
middle of a river crossing.  The risks of attempting transformation under current
circumstances, they could argue, would be compounded by the uncertain
effectiveness of the new and somewhat experimental capabilities being contemplated
under transformation.
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Comparative Costs.  Transformation supporters argue that even if routine
modernization of current capabilities can meet emerging asymmetric security
challenges and preserve U.S. conventional superiority, transformation can achieve
these goals at less expense over the long run, because it will more fully exploit the
warfighting benefits of new technologies than routine modernization can, as well as
facilitate the review and elimination of expensive but unneeded legacy forces.
Skeptics could argue that the costs of transformation, both in the near term and
long term, are uncertain, and that transformation therefore might not necessarily be
less expensive than routine modernization.  They could also argue that transformation
could turn out to be very expensive if the nature of the transformation undertaken
turns out to be incorrect and another set of changes is needed to correct the mistake.
If So, Is The Administration’s Plan Appropriate?
If transformation is judged to be necessary or desirable, a potential follow-on
oversight question for Congress is whether the Administration’s plan for defense
transformation is appropriate in terms of the proposed direction of change and the
proposed strategy for implementing changes.  Each of these issues is discussed
below.
Proposed Direction Of Change.  Current U.S. military forces could be
transformed in a number of ways.  Is the Administration’s plan for transformation
appropriate in terms of how it would change the force?  Discussion on this question
has developed on a number of elements in the Administration’s plan, including those
presented below.
Network-Centric Warfare.  Some observers argue that, as a concept,
network-centric warfare “manifests important and pervasive flaws,” that “there are
serious questions regarding the status of the NCW thesis as a secure and reliable
basis for making [military] capability development decisions,” that “the conclusions
the NCW thesis affords are deficient, for they are drawn from defective premises,”
and that there has been a “low level of skepticism towards [NCW’s] claims displayed
many in the defense community....”27
Other observers, while accepting the validity of NCW, argue that the
Administration’s transformation plan places too much emphasis on the concept.  The
Administration’s plan, they argue, overestimates the potential benefits of NCW and
underestimates its potential risks.  The ability of NCW to overcome uncertainty and
confusion on the battlefield — the fog of war — may not be as great as advocates of
the Administration’s plan make it out to be, they argue, particularly when operating
in certain environments, such as urban areas.  The Administration’s planned
emphasis on NCW, they also argue, could make U.S. forces excessively vulnerable
to electronic jamming and cyberwar attacks aimed at disrupting the computers and
data links that form the network.  Such attacks, if successful, could degrade or even
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bring down the network, they argue, isolating individual U.S. military units and
leaving them potentially vulnerable to destruction.28
Supporters of the Administration’s plan argue that the concept of NCW has
undergone significant and disciplined intellectual development over the past several
years, and that recent military operations have demonstrated the value of networked
operations.  They also argue that DOD is aware that the benefits of NCW can vary
depending on the type of operation in question and the environment in which it is
being conducted.  They also argue that the threat of jamming and cyberwar attacks
is fully recognized and is being taken into account in designing and acquiring the
C4ISR equipment associated with NCW.29
Total Size Of Force.  Some observers believe that the Administration’s
transformation plan calls for a force that is too small to meet the various demands
being placed on it, and that the size of the force, and particularly the Army, needs to
be increased to reduce the strain being placed on individual soldiers.30  The
Administration argues that the planned size of the force is adequate, particularly since
DOD, as part of its transformation effort, is undertaking numerous actions that will
make more efficient use of unformed personnel.
Several Members of Congress and other observers have expressed support for
increasing the size of the Army by 30,000 or more soldiers, and for increasing the
size of the Air Force and Marine Corps as well.  The proposed FY2007 defense
budget and FY2007-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) submitted to
Congress in February 2006 calls for a total of 70 Army combat brigades (42 active
and 28 in the National Guard) rather than the 77 (43 active and 34 in the National
Guard) that DOD officials spoke of in 2005, for reducing active-duty Army forces
from over the next five years from more than 500,000 to 482,000, and for
maintaining the National Guard at 333,000 rather than increasing it to a
congressionally approved level of 350,000.  For further discussion of this issue, see
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Air Power vs. Ground Forces.  In a related debate, some observers argue
that the Administration’s transformation plan places too much emphasis on air power
and not enough emphasis on ground forces.  They argue that not all future wars will
be amenable to campaigns built primarily around air power, and that the
Administration’s planned emphasis on air power could make U.S. operations
vulnerable to failure should adversaries find a way to counter the targeting systems
on which air-delivered weapons rely.32  They also argue that skilled infantrymen are
important for countering certain asymmetric challenges, such as insurgencies, and
that reductions in infantry forces consequently should not be used to finance the
procurement of aircraft and air-delivered weapons.
Supporters of the Administration’s transformation plans argue that it fully
recognizes the value of ground forces for certain operations, that the Army’s plan to
reorganize itself into a force built around brigade-sized units will increase the number
of deployable units for meeting worldwide demands, and that transformation aims
at exploiting NCW and precision weapons to achieve efficiencies where possible in
the numbers of deployed ground troops needed to conduct certain operations.
Supporters of the Administration’s plan argue that it aims at producing military
forces with a wide array of capabilities, of which attacking targets with air-delivered
precision-guided weapons is only one, precisely so that the United States will be able
to fight various kinds of conflicts in the future.  Supporters also argue that operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq show the ability of ground forces to rely on air power when
the two are effectively integrated.
Army Transformation.  Somewhat independent of the debate over the
balance of air power and ground forces, some observers have objected to the
Administration’s plan to reorganize the Army into modular, brigade-sized Units of
Action (UA) because the plan would de-emphasize heavily-armored UAs built
around M1 tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles in favor of newly created, more
mobile “medium-weight” UAs built around the Stryker wheeled combat vehicle.
They have argued that medium-weight units will be less lethal and less survivable
than heavy formations, and that the greater mobility of these forces will simply
permit them to be more easily deployed into situations where they will be defeated
by enemy forces.
Supporters of the Administration’s transformation plans argue that heavily
armored units, though survivable and lethal, are not very mobile, and therefore are
CRS-22
33 The deployment to Iraq of units equipped with the Stryker vehicle may provide a test case
for arguments concerning the merits of medium-weight forces.  Strykers deployed to Iraq
were fitted with add-on armor to defeat rocket-propelled grenades being used by insurgent
forces.
34 Elaine M. Grossman, “Study Finds Army Transformation Plan Weakens Combat
Capability,” Inside the Pentagon, January 26, 2006.
35 For general discussion on the tradeoff between tactical aircraft, UAVs/UCAVs, and long-
range bombers, see CRS Report RL31872, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and
Issues for Congress; and CRS Report RL31544, Long-Range Bombers: Background and
Issues for Congress, both by Christopher Bolkcom.
of little or no value in situations requiring the rapid deployment of meaningful
ground combat capability.  The planned medium-weight units, they argue, will
exploit superior battlespace awareness to help achieve sufficient survivability, and
will employ new weapon technologies to achieve sufficient lethality.33
Other observers, while supporting the idea of reorganizing the Army into
brigade-sized units, have questioned the Army’s approach for doing this.  In January
2006, it was reported that a series of reports by the Institute for Defense Analyses
(IDA) concluded that the Army’s plan for including two (rather than three or four)
battalions in each new brigade could reduce rather than increase the Army’s net
fighting capability.  The Army, according to the press report, strongly contested
IDA’s findings.34
Tactical Aircraft vs. UAVs/UCAVs And Long-Range Bombers.  Some
observers argue that the Administration’s transformation plan places too much
emphasis on shorter-ranged tactical aircraft — the Air Force F-22 Raptor, the Navy
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and the multiservice F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) — and
not enough emphasis on unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), unmanned combat air
vehicles (or UCAVs, which are UAVs armed with weapons), and long-range
bombers.  They argue that the Administration’s plan — which proposes acquiring
thousands of new tactical aircraft while envisaging relatively small numbers of UAVs
and UCAVs and maintaining a relatively small bomber force — is inappropriate
given uncertain future access to in-theater land bases needed for tactical aircraft (as
demonstrated in Afghanistan), the capabilities of UAVs and UCAVs (as
demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq), the age of the bomber force, the ability of
bombers to operate without access to in-theater bases, and the ability of bombers to
deliver large numbers of precision-guided weapons in a single sortie.
The Administration has generally argued that its proposed numbers of new
tactical aircraft are needed to preserve conventional U.S. military superiority (even
when supplemented by UAVs and UCAVs), and that UAVs and UCAVs will
eventually be procured in significant numbers.  The proposed FY2007 defense budget
and FY2007-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) submitted to Congress in
February 2006 calls for substantial increases in procurement funding for UAVs and
UCAVs and for accelerating by two decades the start of an acquisition program for
a new long-range bomber-type aircraft.35
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Special Operations Forces.  The proposed FY2007 defense budget and
FY2007-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) to be submitted to Congress in
February 2006 calls for increasing U.S. special operations forces by 15%.  Some
observers, while acknowledging the effectiveness of special operations forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and in counter-terrorism operations elsewhere, are concerned
that the Administration’s plan places too much emphasis on special operations forces
as a perceived potential solution to a wide array of security problems.  This, they
argue, could lead to the use of special operations forces for addressing security
problems that might be better addressed through other measures; to the overuse of
special operations forces, which could fatigue them and prevent them from
conducting adequate training; or to under-investment in alternative approaches for
addressing certain security problems.  The current high operational tempo of special
operations forces, they argue, can be viewed as evidence that they are now being
overused.
Supporters of the Administration’s plan, while acknowledging that special
operations forces are currently heavily committed around the world, argue that the
Administration’s planned expansion of special operations forces will eventually
permit a reduction in operational tempo for individual units.  They also argue that,
prior to Afghanistan and Iraq, the capabilities of special operations forces, and their
cost-effectiveness in terms of achieving disproportionately large effects on the
conventional battlefield and in counterterrorism operations, was underappreciated.
Current concerns about an excessive reliance on special operations forces, they argue,
are simply reflections of this older and now outdated view.36
Forces for Stability Operations.  Some observers, particularly since the
onset of the U.S.-led stability operation in Iraq, have argued that the Administration’s
transformation plan pays too little attention to the demands that stability operations
place on the military.  Some of these observers have argued in favor of altering the
Administration’s plan to include the creation of units that are organized and trained
specifically for conducting such operations.  Other observers, while not advocating
the creation of dedicated forces for stability operations, have argued in favor of
giving U.S. combat forces more training in such operations, so that they can more
easily shift into such operations when required.37
Reserve Forces.  DOD officials have mentioned the idea of transferring to
active-duty forces parts of certain functions that are now carried out by reserve
forces.  Supporters of this idea argue that this will permit DOD to deploy forces
overseas for contingency operations with less disruption to the daily life of
communities around the country where reservists live and work.  Opponents argue
that the current division of functions between the active and reserve forces, which
dates to the years immediately following the Vietnam war, was designed precisely
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so that large-scale commitments of U.S. forces overseas would require the activation
of significant numbers of reserve personnel.  Shifting to the active forces functions
now carried out by reserve units, these opponents argue, would undermine this
arrangement, which is intended to encourage people in affected communities to
contact their representatives in Congress and thereby help ensure that elected officials
in Washington consider such commitments carefully before approving them.38
As mentioned earlier, the proposed FY2007 defense budget and FY2007-
FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) calls for reducing the number of
National Guard combat brigades from 34 to 28, offsetting this reduction by
increasing the number of Guard support brigades, and maintaining the National
Guard at 333,000 rather than increasing it to a congressionally approved level of
350,000.  Numerous Members of Congress have expressed opposition to this
proposal.
Missile Defense.  Some observers criticize the Administration’s
transformation plan for placing too much emphasis on missile defense programs at
the expense of other defense-spending priorities.  They argue that the Administration
has overstated the urgency of the ballistic missile threat at the expense of other
potential threats, such as cruise missiles, that the Administration is rushing to deploy
missile defenses without first adequately testing them, and that the Administration
is wasting limited resources by unnecessarily rushing to deploy systems with limited
capabilities that will soon be replaced by more capable versions.
Supporters of the Administration’s plan argue that the Administration has
correctly assessed the urgency of the ballistic missile threat, that adequate attention
is being paid to other potential threats such as cruise missiles, that testing of missile
defense systems will continue while early versions are fielded, and that the early
versions fielded will have some capability to stop enemy ballistic missiles and will
consequently help deter other countries from launching ballistic missile attacks by
complicating their calculations regarding the potential for such attacks to succeed.39
Effects-Based Operations.  Some observers, while acknowledging the
potential value of effects-based operations, argue that the concept is currently not that
well defined, and that until it is better defined and its potential value consequently
better understood, it should not be featured as a key element in the Administration’s
transformation plan.  Retired Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, in an exchange of
e-mails with active-duty generals in December 2005, strongly criticized the role of
effects-based operations in current military planning and military education.  One of
his e-mails states in part:
Let me turn now to what I perceive to be a lack of intellectual content in
emerging joint concepts.
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Assigning our best thinkers to infuse content into vacuous slogans such as
“information superiority” and “dominant maneuver,” is fruitless and wastes
valuable resources.  Even worse, such efforts are potentially dangerous when
they produce an empty “concept” that is imposed upon our operating forces.  I
believe there is considerable evidence that the latter is happening.
Several cases come to mind, none more egregious than the idea of
“effects-based operations.”...
This targeting methodology is eminently sensible and proved its worth during
Operation Desert Storm.....
Unfortunately, [one advocate] argued after Desert Storm that this
“effects-based” approach offered a new way to plan for and conduct all military
operations....
The effects-based operations concept, despite its title, is at most a concept
for planning not an operating concept....  However, even as a planning concept
its utility is limited since it does not deal with the interactively complex systems
that make up most of the systems that military forces deal with....
If there is an advantage to effects-based operations as an approach to
operational art, it must be explainable in simple English.  Moreover, if the joint
community desires to introduce this term into the existing planning lexicon its
proponents should be able to explain how it improves upon current terms,
especially mission with its inherent task and purpose or intent.  They have not!
Incredibly, some officers in the joint community are advocating for an entirely
new definition of mission that would include effects....
Since retiring eight years ago I have spent considerable time teaching and
mentoring field grade officers.  Without a doubt, they are the most motivated and
intellectually curious officers the American military has ever produced.
Recently, however, I have found they lack a firm grasp of many proven doctrinal
concepts and their speech and writing is filled increasingly with an unintelligible
“effects-speak.”  A flawed force development process is producing a plethora of
concepts that, from my observations, make it difficult to focus current force
development efforts.  In addition, it is eroding what until recently was a clear and
concise professional lexicon.40
Other observers argue that the Administration’s emphasis on effects-based
operations overlooks the potential advantages of attrition-style warfare.  Attrition
warfare, they argue, leads to the assured destruction of enemy military forces in the
field, while effects-based operations, by bypassing certain enemy forces, can permit
those forces to blend back into the population at large and prepare for a post-war
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insurgency campaign that U.S. forces might find more difficult and costly to counter.
They further argue that effects-based operations may bring about the collapse of an
enemy regime so quickly, and with so little effect on the country’s population at
large, that the population may not feel that it has been subdued or defeated, possibly
making them defiant and more willing to support such an insurgency.41
Supporters of the Administration’s plan argue that the concept of effects-based
operations is well on its way to being defined, that it is undergoing further intensive
development at U.S. Joint Forces Command and elsewhere, and that the value of
effects-based operations has already been demonstrated in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
Iraq.  They also argue that the potential consequences of attrition warfare (including
those caused by large numbers of civilian deaths and large amounts of damage to
non-military buildings and infrastructure) have become politically untenable, and that
no attrition-style campaign could be so complete as to prevent the subsequent
emergence of an insurgency conducted by a relatively small number of opponents
who survived the period of major combat.  Supporters of the Administration’s plan
can argue that even if effects-based operations might make post-conflict stability
operations more challenging, this is not an argument against using effects-based
operations to fight conflicts, but rather an argument for having better capabilities for
conducting post-conflict stability operations.
Asymmetric Threats.  Some observers are concerned that the
Administration’s transformation plan, by increasing current U.S. capabilities for
conventional warfare, could paradoxically produce undesired results by encouraging
potential adversaries to abandon conventional military competition — an area where
the United States can compete effectively — and put more of their energies into
developing asymmetric responses that will be more difficult for the United States to
counter, such as terrorism, nuclear weapons, and cyberwar attacks against civilian
computer systems important to the functioning of the U.S. and world economy.42
Rather than working to discourage potential adversaries from competing against the
United States in conventional capability, they argue, the United States should seek
to maintain conventional forces that are superior to those of potential adversaries, but
not so superior that they drive potential adversaries away from spending resources
on conventional competition.
Other observers, conversely, are concerned that the Administration’s
transformation plan places too much emphasis on countering asymmetric threats such
as terrorism, and not enough emphasis on preparing for future conventional military
challenges 10 or 20 years from now from a potential major regional peer competitor,
such as China.
Supporters of the Administration’s plan could argue that potential adversaries
are already pursuing asymmetric responses to U.S. military capabilities.  Increasing
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the current U.S. superiority in conventional warfare, they could argue, will not
change this, but it will permit U.S. forces to conduct successful conventional
operations more quickly, with fewer lives lost, and at lower cost.  Supporters also
argue that the Administration’s transformation plan pays adequate planning attention
to the possibility of a conventional military challenge 10 or 20 years from now from
a major regional peer competitor such as China.43
Afghanistan And Iraq War As Test Cases.  Since the merits of the
Administration’s proposed direction of change under its transformation plan are the
subject of debate, many observers have focused on recent U.S. military operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq as potential test cases for validating or disproving various
aspects of that plan.  Operations in Afghanistan were viewed by many observers as
highlighting the potential capabilities of special operations forces, particularly when
operating in conjunction with aircraft armed with precision-guided weapons, and of
UAVs and UCAVs.  Operations in Iraq have been debated in terms of whether they
validate the Administration’s overall transformation vision, and in terms of specific
issue areas such as NCW, Army forces, and special operations forces.  For extended
discussions on these topics, see CRS Report RL31946, Iraq War: Defense Program
Implications for Congress, coordinated by Ronald O’Rourke.
Proposed Strategy For Implementing Transformation.  Is the
Administration’s plan for transformation appropriate in terms of its proposed
implementation strategy?  Potential areas of discussion on this issue include those
presented below.
Overall Leadership and Management of Transformation.  A December
2004 report from the Government Accountability Office on DOD’s transformation
efforts states:
DOD has taken positive steps to design and implement a complex strategy to
transform U.S. military capabilities, but it has not established clear leadership
and accountability or fully adopted results-oriented management tools to help
guide and successfully implement this approach.  The responsibility for
transforming military capabilities is currently spread among various DOD
organizations, with no one person or entity having the overarching and ongoing
leadership responsibilities or the accountability for achieving transformation
results.  In addition, although DOD established an informal crosscutting group
that meets occasionally to discuss transformation issues, this group has no
charter, formal responsibilities, or authority to direct changes.  GAO has
previously reported that key practices for successful transformation include
leadership that sets the direction of transformation and assigns accountability for
results, and the use of crosscutting implementation teams, which can provide the
day-to-day management needed for success.  In recent testimony on DOD’s
business transformation, we underscored the importance of these elements and
stated that DOD has not routinely assigned accountability for performance to
specific organizations or individuals who have sufficient authority to accomplish
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goals.  DOD officials believe that a single organization accountable for
transformation results and a formal implementation team are not necessary
because existing informal mechanisms involve key organizations that can
individually implement needed changes, and an annual assessment of
transformation roadmaps is prepared for the Secretary of Defense, who can direct
the transformation efforts of each organization.  However, in the absence of clear
leadership, accountability, and a formal implementation mechanism, DOD may
have difficulty resolving differences among competing priorities, directing
resources to the highest priorities, and ensuring progress should changes in
senior personnel occur.  In addition, informal mechanisms are not sufficient to
provide transparency to the process or assurance to Congress that DOD is
allocating resources to address needed improvements rather than desired
improvements.
While DOD’s strategy to transform military capabilities is a good first step, DOD
has not fully developed results-oriented management tools that can help
managers effectively implement and manage major efforts, and focus on
achieving results.  Specifically, DOD has not revised its initial transformation
goals, set in 2001, to reflect new joint concepts — thus, DOD lacks a foundation
for developing other tools such as performance goals and measures and linking
specific resources needed to achieve each goal.  DOD faces challenges in
developing these tools because the joint concepts are being developed
concurrently with its plans to acquire new capabilities.  But without these
results-oriented tools, it will be difficult for DOD to determine the extent to
which its transformation efforts are achieving desired results, to measure its
overall progress, or to provide transparency for how billions of dollars in planned
investments are being applied.44
Funding For Transformation vs. Near-Term Priorities.  Some observers
argue that the Administration’s plan for implementing transformation provides too
much funding for longer-term transformation goals and not enough funding for near-
term needs.  They have argued, for example, that the Administration’s plan provides
significant funding for development of next-generation Army combat vehicles, but
inadequate funding for modernization of current Army M1 tanks and M2 Bradley
fighting vehicles.  They also argue that the Administration has not adequately funded
certain near-term Army readiness needs, such as ceramic body armor, Humvees with
improved armor, and helicopter survivability equipment.
Other observers argue, conversely, that the Administration’s plan, though
nominally supportive of transformation, provides too much funding for legacy
systems and not enough funding for transformation-related programs.  They argue,
for example, that even if one agrees with the relative emphasis in the
Administration’s transformation plan on tactical aircraft vs. UAVs/UCAVs and long-
range bombers, the Administration’s plan includes excessive amounts of funding for
procurement of tactical aircraft while underfunding development of UAVs and
UCAVs.
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Supporters of the Administration’s plan argue that it strikes the right balance
between funding for legacy systems vs. transformation-related programs.  They can
argue that tactical aircraft like the F-22 and the STOVL (short takeoff, vertical
landing) version of the JSF can be considered transformational, and that the
Administration’s plan includes actions aimed at ensuring that all tactical aircraft are
procured in an economical fashion.  Spending on UAVs and UCAVs, they argue, will
increase substantially when UAVs and UCAVs now in development emerge from the
development process and start to be procured in larger numbers.  Legacy systems,
supporters argue, should be modernized only if not doing so would create
unacceptable operational risks, and that if instances are discovered where inadequate
funding for modernization of legacy equipment creates unacceptable operational
risks, additional funding can be moved into those areas to address the shortfall. 
Office of Force Transformation.  Particularly in light of the set of options
for OFT’s future that reportedly has been prepared to OSD’s consideration (see
Background section), as well as the suggestion in the DSB report that OFT might no
longer be necessary, potential questions for Congress regarding the role of OFT in
implementing transformation include the following:
! Is OFT still necessary?  Should it remain in operation in some form,
or should it be disestablished?
! Does OFT have too much, not enough, or about the right amount of
authority, staffing, and funding to carry out its responsibilities in
promoting transformation and overseeing the transformation efforts
of the various services and DOD agencies?45
! Should OFT remain an office within OSD that reports directly to the
Secretary of Defense, or should it be moved to another location
within DOD, such as under DOD’s acquisition office or under U.S.
Joint Forces Command?
! What are the potential advantages and disadvantages of giving OFT
authority to allocate larger amounts of funding for use in
transformation-related research, development, and exercises?
! Is OFT exercising too much, not enough, or about the right amount
of control over the content of the transformation road maps
submitted by the individual services and agencies?  Are OFT’s
efforts to ensure compatibility and commonality among the service’s
transformation road maps reducing the potential benefits that can
come from allowing service-unique perspectives to be articulated?
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! How good a job is OFT doing in explaining and garnering support
for the general concept of transformation, and for specific
transformation ideas?46
! To what degree have OFT’s ideas on transformation been a product
of the thinking of its first director, retired Navy vice admiral Arthur
Cebrowski, and how might OFT’s approach toward transformation
change now under new leadership?
! In light of the responsibilities and potential influence of OFT, should
the position of Director of OFT be made a Senate-confirmable
position?
U.S. Joint Forces Command.  Potential questions for Congress regarding
the role of USJFCOM in implementing transformation are similar to those above
regarding OFT:
! Does USJFCOM have too much, not enough, or about the right
amount of authority, staffing, and funding to carry out its
responsibilities in developing joint doctrine for transformation and
in managing joint exercises for testing transformation ideas?
! How good a job is USJFCOM doing in developing joint doctrine to
be used by the services in developing compatible transformation
road maps?
! What are the potential advantages and disadvantages of giving
USJFCOM authority to allocate larger amounts of funding not
simply for transformation-related research, development, and
exercises, but for procurement of transformation-related equipment
to be used by operational forces?47
CRS-31
48 Using funds authorized in FY2004, DOD plans to open the JNTC in October 2004.  For
FY2005, DOD is requesting $191 million to continue and expand the JNTC in FY2005.  For
more on the JNTC, see “Joint National Training Capability: The Next Wave In
Transformation,” op cit;  Kim Burger, “US Forces To Get More Realistic Joint Exercises,”
Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 11, 2002;  Marc Strass, “Giambastiani: Joint National
Training Center Needed For Service Training,” Defense Daily, July 29, 2002, p. 6.
49 Some observers, for example, expressed concern that USJFCOM’s large Millennium
Challenge 2002 exercise may have been scripted to ensure the success of favored DOD
transformation ideas.  See Richard Hart Sinnreich, “Cooking The Books Won’t Help The
Military Transform,” Lawton (OK) Constitution, August 18, 2002, p. 4; Dale Eisman,
“Pentagon Leaders Defend War Game,”  Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, August 21, 2002; Michael
Gilbert, “General: Stryker Unit’s Performance Not At Issue,” Tacoma New Tribune, August
22, 2002; Dennis O’Brien, “Controversial War Game Improved Warriors,” Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot, August 23, 2002; Sean D. Naylor, “Fixed War Game?,” Army Times,
August 26, 2002, p. 8;  Jason Ma, “In Simulation, Navy Suffers Heavy Losses, Including
Aircraft Carrier,” Inside the Navy, August 26, 2002: 1;  Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Let’s
Not Rig Our War Games,” Wall Street Journal, August 29, 2002; William F. Kernan, “Joint
War Games,”  Army Times, September 16, 2002, p. 52 (letter to the editor);  Bradley
Graham, “Criticism Of War Game Rejected,” Washington Post, September 18, 2002, p. 27;
Elaine M. Grossman, “Generals Take Stock Of U.S. Vulnerability To Common
Technologies, “Inside the Pentagon, September 19, 2002;  Michael Schrage, “Military
Overkill Defeats Virtual War,” Washington Post, September 22, 2002, p. B5; Lionel Van
Deerlin, “Taking Their Warships And Going Home,” San Diego Union-Tribune, November
6, 2002; and Jeff Huber, “Invasion of the Transformers,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
October 2003, pp. 74-76, particularly the section entitled “New Dogs, Old Tricks.”
See also Loren B. Thompson, “Revolution Gone Awry[:] How Transformation May
Undermine Military Preparedness,” Remarks Before the Council on Foreign Relations
Security Roundtable, November 18, 2002 and Keith J. Costa, “Konetzni: Transformation
In Need Of ‘Solid Intellectual Analysis,’”  Inside the Pentagon, May 22, 2003.
! Is DOD requesting adequate funding for operating and expanding
the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) that is to be used by
USJFCOM for conducting joint exercises?48
! Do USJFCOM’s dual roles as a provider of joint forces and as
DOD’s premier transformation laboratory conflict with one another,
and if so, what are the options for resolving the conflict?
! Are the transformation-related activities of OFT and USJFCOM
sufficiently coordinated?
Experiments And Exercises.  Some observers have expressed concern
about whether experiments and exercises carried out nominally in support of
transformation are sufficiently focused on exploring transformational warfighting
ideas as opposed to demonstrating existing non-transformational capabilities.
Observers have also expressed concerned about whether experiments and exercises
are sufficiently challenging and realistic, and whether they are “scripted” to ensure
the success of favored transformation ideas.49  Potential questions for Congress
regarding transformation-related tests and exercises include the following:
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! Does the Administration’s plan include too many, not enough, or
about the right amount of transformation-related experiments and
exercises?
! Are these experiments and exercises adequately funded to fulfill
their stated objectives?
! Are they oriented toward examining transformational ideas, or are
they oriented toward demonstrating existing or incrementally
improved capabilities?
! Are they sufficiently challenging and realistic?  Do they allow for
failures from which lessons can be learned, or are they scripted to
ensure the success of transformation ideas that are already believed
to be true?
! How, if at all, have lessons from these experiments and exercises to
date affected DOD’s transformation plan?
Metrics for Transformation.  Advocates of transformation argue that new
metrics (i.e., methods of measurement or measures of effectiveness) will be needed
to accurately measure the capabilities of transformed military forces and the
effectiveness of transformational military systems, organizational changes, and
concepts of operation.  Traditional methods for measuring military power, such as
the total number of divisions, air wings, and ships, they argue, will need to be
replaced by more sophisticated measures that take into account not only the raw
numbers of platforms or units in a military force, but also the effect of NCW, EBO,
and other new technologies and ideas in increasing the overall effectiveness of a
force that includes a certain number of such platforms.  Similarly, they argue that in
assessing the effectiveness of proposed transformational weapon systems, traditional
performance measures, such as platform speed and range, will need to be
supplemented or replaced by new measures that take into account factors such as the
system’s ability to operate in a network environment so as to contribute to, and take
advantage of, targeting and other information distributed over the network.  Potential
questions for Congress include the following:
! To what degree has DOD developed new metrics for measuring the
capabilities of transformed military forces and the effectiveness of
transformational military systems?  To what degree is DOD using
these new metrics in making decisions about programs and
resources?  When will the process of developing and applying new
metrics be complete?
! Who is involved in developing the new metrics, and what process is
being used to develop them?
! Are DOD’s emerging new metrics unduly biased against legacy
forces?  Are they unduly biased in favor of its own transformation
proposals vs. transformation proposals offered by others?
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Independent Analysis.  Some observers have expressed concern that there
has been relatively little formal analysis or review by specialists independent of DOD
of the merits of the Administration’s proposals for transformation.  One article, for
example, states:
There’s at least one potential drawback to all of this “transformation”: It has been
subjected to remarkably little outside scrutiny or independent analysis....
Indeed, without rigorous congressional oversight or a thorough analysis of the
risks-versus-rewards trade-offs of transformation, experts worry that the rapid
and profound changes now under way could lead to unpleasant and unintended
surprises. As Pentagon officials have rewritten U.S. strategic war plans, they
have touted the success of the three-week Iraqi Freedom campaign. But relatively
little analysis has been conducted of the difficult aftermath in Iraq and whether
the war-fighting model actually contributed to many of the post-conflict
difficulties. Many military experts also caution that the Iraqi army was too weak
an opponent on which to base such fundamental reforms....
Even some transformation advocates question whether Rumsfeld’s plans have
enough checks and balances in place. The transformation umbrella is casting an
ever-greater shadow over a growing host of initiatives, for instance, that have not
seen the light of independent scrutiny. “Without independent analysis, we may
never know the true lessons of the Iraq war,” Krepinevich said. Clear troubles
that arose with that campaign, such as problems with logistics and supply, have
not been studied adequately, he says. “Basically, the Pentagon and U.S. military
are grading their own homework.”50
Culture of Innovation.  DOD officials and other observers note that instilling
a culture of innovation among DOD personnel will be critical to implementing
transformation.51  Instilling such a culture could involve things such as actions to
create an institutional and workplace receptiveness to new ideas, procedures for
protecting  people who generate new ideas, and avoidance of the so-called “zero-
defect” approach for assessing performance and selecting people for advancement.52
Potential challenges to creating a culture of innovation include a widespread
familiarity and comfort with the status quo, the so-called “not-invented-here”
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syndrome,53 a cadre of senior officers who were taught, and have spent their entire
careers abiding by, traditional ideas and practices, and the difficulty of quantifying
or explaining the potential advantages of proposed innovations.
A 2002 survey of more than 2,500 U.S. military officers provided mixed
evidence on whether those officers believed such a culture was being created.54
Potential questions for Congress include the following:
! What steps have been taken, or are planned, to promote a culture of
innovation among DOD personnel to support transformation?
! What incentives are in place, or will be in place, to reward the
generation of innovative ideas?  What additional incentives are
required?
! What actions have been taken, or will be taken, to ensure that
personnel who propose innovative ideas will not be penalized when
those ideas are rejected or are disproved in experiments and
exercises?
! What provisions does the Administration’s approach to
transformation have for maintaining and protecting in-house
contrarian thinkers — what might be called “members of the loyal
opposition” — whose transformation ideas, though rejected or
disproved in experiments and exercises, might one day, under
different circumstances, prove useful?
! What changes, if any, to officer education and officer career paths
are needed to promote a culture of innovation?  How many of these
changes have been made?  Of those that haven’t, how many would
require legislation to implement?
! What evidence is there that a culture of innovation is taking root?
In what ways has the Administration’s transformation plan been
altered by innovative ideas generated by officers who are not in
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Potential Implications for Congressional Oversight of DOD
A third potential issue for Congress concerns the implications of defense
transformation for congressional oversight of DOD activities.  Potential areas of
focus include organizational issues, sufficiency of information and metrics for
assessment, oversight of weapons acquisition, the Administration’s use of the
concept of transformation in justifying its proposals to Congress, and potential
Congressional initiatives on transformation.
Committee Organization.  The concept of transformation can lead to new
ways of examining defense issues.  It can, for example, lead to a greater focus on
examining issues from a joint rather than service-specific perspective, a greater focus
on asymmetric as opposed to conventional military threats, or a greater focus on
networks, sensors, and C4ISR equipment rather than individual military platforms
such as aircraft, ships, and ground vehicles.
The defense oversight committees in recent years have responded to this
situation by making certain changes in organization and activities.  The Senate
Armed Services Committee, for example, created a new subcommittee on emerging
threats and capabilities, while the House Armed Services Committee created a new
subcommittee on terrorism, unconventional threats and capabilities.  The committees
have shifted staff assignments and hired new staff to increase their ability to conduct
oversight of transformation-related topics such as C4ISR programs.  And the
committees have held a number of hearings on transformation and transformation-
related topics.  A potential question for Congress at this point is whether any further
organizational changes are needed to improve the ability of the defense-oversight
committees to incorporate the concept of transformation into congressional oversight
of DOD activities.
Adequacy of Information and Metrics for Assessment.
Transformation is a broad topic with many elements subject to frequent change and
development.  In addition, measuring progress in attaining transformation can be a
complex undertaking.  Transformation thus raises a potential issue as to whether
Congress has adequate information and tools for assessing DOD’s progress in
implementing transformation.  Potential questions for Congress on this issue include
the following:
! Are the defense budget and related budget-justification documents
that are submitted to Congress adequately organized and presented
to support the incorporation of the concept of transformation into
Congress’s review of the budget?  If not, in what ways should the
organization and content of the budget and the budget-justification
documents be changed?
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! Does DOD provide Congress with sufficiently detailed and periodic
information about the status of DOD transformation efforts to
support congressional oversight of these efforts?  Should Congress,
for example, require DOD to submit periodic reports on the status of
transformation in general, or of specific aspects of transformation?
! Does Congress have adequate metrics for measuring military
capability in light of transformation-related changes, such as NCW,
or for assessing DOD’s success in implementing transformation?
Oversight of Weapons Acquisition.  As mentioned earlier, the
administration, as part of its efforts in support of transformation, has revised the
regulations governing the acquisition of new weapons and systems with the aim of
saving money and reducing acquisition cycle time.  Key among the changes
implemented by DOD is evolutionary acquisition with spiral development (EA/SD),
which DOD has identified as its new preferred acquisition strategy.
Although the overall goal of EA/SD — to make the acquisition system more
responsive to rapid changes in threats, technology, and warfighter needs — is widely
supported (as discussed in more detail in CRS Report RS21195, Evolutionary
Acquisition and Spiral Development in DOD Programs:  Policy Issues for Congress,
by Gary J. Pagliano and Ronald O’Rourke), EA/SD poses potentially significant
issues for congressional oversight, particularly for newly initiated weapon acquisition
programs, in three areas:
! Ambiguous initial program description.  Programs initiated under
EA/SD may not be well defined at the outset in terms of system
design, quantities to be procured, development and procurement
costs, and program schedule.  These are key program characteristics
that Congress in the past has wanted to understand in some detail
before deciding whether to approve the start of a new weapon
acquisition program.  EA/SD can thus put Congress in the position
of deciding whether to approve the start of a new a program with
less information than it has had in the past.
! Lack of well-defined benchmarks.  A corollary to the above is that
Congress may not, years later, have well-defined initial program
benchmarks against which to measure the performance of the
military service managing the program or the contractor.
! Funding projections potentially more volatile.  Although
projections of future funding requirements for weapons acquisition
programs are subject to change for various reasons, funding
projections for EA/SD programs may be subject to even greater
volatility due to each program’s inherent potential for repeated
refinements in performance requirements or technical approaches.
As a result, any long-range projections of future funding
requirements for EA/SD programs may be even less reliable than
projections for systems pursued under the traditional DOD
acquisition approach.
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Supporters of EA/SD argue that it can improve congressional oversight of DOD
weapon acquisition programs because the information that DOD provides for a given
program will focus on the specific part of the program that is proposed for
development over the next few years.  This information, they argue, will be more
reliable — and thus better for Congress to use in conducting its oversight role — than
the kind of long-range information that used to be provided under the traditional
DOD acquisition approach.  Skeptics of EA/SD, however, could argue that it has the
potential for drawing Congress into programs to a point where extrication becomes
difficult if not impossible, and without a clear idea of a program’s ultimate
objectives.  Skeptics could also argue that a lack of long-term cost and performance
projections makes it more difficult to assess potential long-term affordability and cost
effectiveness.
Potential questions for Congress and DOD regarding congressional oversight
of EA/SD programs include the following:
! What might be the impact on both congressional approval of new
weapon acquisition programs and subsequent congressional
oversight of those programs, of having limited initial detail in terms
of system design, quantities to be procured, procurement schedules,
and total costs?
! How might congressional oversight of weapon development
programs be affected if program information with longer time
horizons but potentially less reliability is exchanged for program
information with potentially greater short-term reliability — but
without previously available, if imperfect, estimates of full program
costs?
! To what extent might DOD’s new preference for EA/SD be
influenced, as some critics contend, by the knowledge that it might
relieve DOD of the responsibility for providing specific answers to
congressional questions regarding system architecture, effectiveness,
time lines, long-term strategic implications and cost?
Transformation As All-Purpose Justification Tool.  Some observers are
concerned that the Administration’s regular (some might even say habitual) use of
the term transformation in discussing its proposals for DOD during the period 2001-
2004 turned the concept of transformation into an empty slogan or buzz-phrase.
Other observers are concerned that the Administration has invoked the term
transformation as an all-purpose rhetorical tool for justifying its various proposals for
DOD, whether they relate to transformation or not, and for encouraging minimal
debate on those proposals by tying the concept of transformation to the urgent need
to fight the war on terrorism.
Concerns along these lines were heightened by the “Defense Transformation for
the 21st Century Act of 2003,” a 205-page legislative proposal that the Administration
submitted to Congress on April 10, 2003, that would, among other things, permit
DOD to establish its own policies for hiring, firing, and compensating its civil service
CRS-38
56 See, for example, John M. Donnelly, “Hill Rebuffing Rumsfeld Plan To Kill Reports To
Congress,” Defense Week Daily Update, May 15, 2003; John Liang, “House Democrats
Object To DoD Transformation Legislation,” InsideDefense.com, May 14, 2003; William
Matthews and Gopal Ratnam, “Transformation Act Draws U.S. Lawmakers’ Fire,”
DefenseNews, May 5, 2003, p. 1; and Lawrence Korb, “Pentagon Independence,”
DefenseNews, June 2, 2003, p. 29.  For more on this proposed leguislative package, see CRS
Report RL31916, Defense Department Original Transformation Proposal: Compared to
Existing Law, by Robert L. Goldich, et al.
employees; change the terms in office for certain senior generals and admirals; give
DOD increased authority to transfer funds between DOD budget accounts; alter laws
relating to the protection of marine mammals; and eliminate many DOD reporting
requirements that were instituted to assist Congress in conducting oversight of DOD
activities.56
Potential oversight questions for Congress relating to the Administration’s use
of transformation in justifying its proposals for DOD include the following:
! Has the Administration debased the concept of transformation
through overuse?
! Has the Administration, in justifying its proposals for DOD, drawn
adequate distinctions between proposals that are transformational
and proposals that are not transformational but might nevertheless
be worthwhile for other reasons?
! Has the Administration used the term transformation in part to cloud
potential issues pertaining to its proposals for DOD or to minimize
congressional debate on those proposals?
! Has the Administration used the large, complex, and somewhat
abstract topic of transformation in part to occupy Congress’s
attention and thereby distract Congress from conducting detailed
oversight on DOD’s proposed budgets, or to keep Congress off
balance as it attempts to conduct oversight of DOD activities?
Congressional Transformation Initiatives.  In addition to responding to
DOD proposals for transformation, Congress may consider the option of instituting
its transformation initiatives not proposed by DOD.  As mentioned in the background
section, Congress in the past has initiated changes that can be viewed as
transformational that were not originally proposed by DOD.  Potential questions for
Congress in connection with potential new congressional transformation initiatives
include the following:
! Are there any potentially worthy areas of transformation, or ideas or
proposals for transformation, that DOD has overlooked or paid too
little attention to in its transformation planning?
! Are there any DOD goals for transformation that Congress should
consider expanding or accelerating? 
